Drawing on the work of medical historian Daniel Fox, Robinson’s model looked to better understand public, medical, and governmental responses to the 1793 outbreak through 7 distinct foci. In many cases, the behaviors he identified are echoed by the COVID-19 outbreak. Philadelphians (1) underestimated or denied the severity of the epidemic; followed by (2) acceptance and shows of public fearlessness. As the disease spread, many Philadelphians (3) fled from high-infection zones and looked for scapegoats. Infected people were (4) isolated and quarantined. As the scale of institutional failure became clear, (5) voluntary coalitions and associations were established to compensate this as the (6) medical establishment failed to adapt and experienced profound personnel shortages. In the aftermath of the outbreak, (7) changes were made to improve future responses. Robinson’s model will loosely guide the way this article relates the history of the 1793 Yellow Fever Epidemic. However, like the still-evolving COVID-19 pandemic, the story of the 1793 Yellow Fever outbreak is complex, drawing together different social, cultural, political, and medical phenomena. My hope is that this article, in bringing these narrative strands into conversation, will suggest that our “unprecedented times” may not be that unprecedented after all. . . . America was a teenager in 1793. Philadelphia, which was the young nation’s temporary capital during the Revolutionary War, served this function again between 1790 and 1800 while Washington DC was being built (Sivitz and Smith). It was a booming metropolis and an intellectual and cultural hub that increasingly attracted migrants drawn by economic opportunity. Hundreds of ships docked annually in the Port of Philadelphia to unload goods and immigrants from around the world. As the city grew, the problems associated with urban life increased, especially unsanitary living conditions that correspond with overcrowding. As early as 1744, Dr. Alexander Hamilton (the Maryland physician not to be confused with the revolutionary politician), wrote that “the majority of the houses were mean and low, and much decayed; the streets in general not paved, very dirty and obstructed with rubbish and lumber.” Even so, he noted, there was much promise that Philadelphia would flourish in the coming years into the “chief city in America” (Hamilton 20). According to Sivitz and Smith’s survey of structure density by city block between 1789 and 1791, Philadelphia’s population was at its most concentrated along the Delaware River. The closely-stacked houses and trash littered streets of these neighborhoods provided fertile grounds for disease outbreak; although, as we shall come to see, population density was not the primary reason for the disease’s prevalence in these areas. 53
54 Publizr Home